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RECENT BOOKS
LAw IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. By C. J. Friedrich.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1958. Pp. x, 253. $4.75.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF

This excellent book is an English version of the author's Die Philosophie
des Rechts in Historischer Perspektive, which appeared in Germany in
1955 as a part of an encyclopedia of law and political science. In keeping
with the purpose of the original publication, the volume presents a broadgauged analysis of some central problems of legal philosophy-first and
primarily from a historical, ·subsequently from a systematic viewpointrather than a detailed introduction to the history and present status of
the general theory of law. To the novice in the field who wishes to obtain
a full view of jurisprudential thought in its historical setting, this volume,
because of the compactness of its exposition and the selectivity of its
approach, does not afford an easy tool of learning. But those who have
already acquired a general familiarity with the thinkers and subjects
covered by the book will find it filled with suggestive ideas and original
interpretations.
The selec~ive method chosen by Professor Friedrich in surveying the
Western heritage of legal-philosophical doctrine is evidenced by the preferential treatment given to Greek and Roman -legal thought, medieval
legal philosophy, and the classical law-of-nature movement of the 17th
and 18th centuries; more than one-half of the book is devoted to a discussion of these subjects. There are also brief but penetrating chapters
on Hegel and the Historical School, Marx,and Engels, Jhering and Stammler. The various strands of twentieth-century positivism, relativism, and
legal realism are dealt with on 12 pages under the heading "The Decline
of Legal Philosophy." This chapter is followed by a general and illuminating discussion of the revival of natural law in Europe and America which
includes an account of the legal philosophy of Leonard Nelson, a European
legal thinker largely unknown in the Anglo-American world.
Professor Friedrich contributes a number of fresh insights to the history
of jurisprudential ideas. This reviewer found particularly suggestive the
author's analysis of the impact made by the Old Testament on Western
man's attitude toward -law; his exposition of the similarities as well as the
differences between the Platonic-Aristotelian and the Stoic doctrines of
law; his account of the legal philosophy of the 16th-century humanists,
a topic often neglected in traditional histories of legal and political thought;
his correction of some misconceptions current with respect to Hegel's ideas
about law and the state; and his interesting reappraisal of the Marxian
theory of law.
There is room for dissent on some of the comments and observations
made by Professor Friedrich. This reviewer is inclined to hold that the
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relativistic strain in Greek sophist doctrine was more pronounced than
Professor Friedrich seems to intimate, and that Protagoras' apothegm "Man
is the measure of all things" refers to individual man rather than to universal man. It may also be questioned whether the statement "justice is
subordinated to order and thus to the will of hi_m. who possesses the authority to make the laws" applies without qualifications to the legal philosophy
of Hugo Grotius. Furthermore, issue might be taken with Professor Friedrich's comment that Hobbes' attitude toward law was "radically positivist."
As the author himself subsequently recognizes, Hobbes still believed in an
objective philosophy of values; and though he denied that a law could
be "unjust" in a legally relevant sense, he admitted the possibility of
"iniquitous" laws. Hobbes' conspicuous leanings toward positivism are
clearly indicated by his general refusal to recognize other than supranatural
sanctions for a violation of natural laws by the sovereign; but he recognized
a right of resistance in one situation, i.e., when the sovereign had lost the
power of preserving the peace in society and protecting the safety of
the citizens. Finally, this reviewer has some question as to whether it
is justified to pair Jhering and Stammler as legal philosophers, notwithstanding a certain similarity in the liberally-oriented political attitude
of these writers.
The small space allotted by Professor Friedrich to positivism and
modem legal realism (and also to sociological jurisprudence) can be fully
defended from the point of view of an analysis which is interested primarily
in broad philosophical issues and the elaboration of standards for the
evaluation of the positive legal system. The brief systematic part following
the historical chapters shows clearly that in Professor Friedrich's contemplation a philosophy of values is a necessary and integral part of a sound
theory of law. He identifies order and justice as the principal values which
must be served by the law. Although one might disagree with Professor
Friedrich's sweeping statement that "a doctrine of justice is equivalent to
a law of nature whether taken formally or substantively," it is certainly
true that there exists a close link between these two time-honored notions
of legal philosophy, and that a balanced theory of justice must pay close
attention to whatever common elements there may be found in the nature
and characteristic traits of human beings.
The author also discusses the role which the common man should
play in the fashioning of a legal system rooted in justice. Although he
rejects the propositions that the common man must decide everything
in a well-ordered community and that he must be presupposed to be
"collectively infallible," Professor Friedrich's philosophy is strongly imbued with democratic values. This is very evident from his definition of
just law as "a system of reasonable rules which are grounded in the common
experience of man, which seek to realize justice, which are created with
the participation of all 'the members of the legal community on the basis
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of a constitution, and which rest upon the continuous common effort of
these members." After offering his thoughts on the relationship between
justice, equality, and democratic action, the author presents us, in the
last four chapters of the book, with reflections on the difference between
legality and legitimacy, the problem of the breach of the law, the role of
constitutions in the building of legal orders, and the prospects of creating
a world community based on law.
A reader interested in a succinct but incisive treatment of some of
the most challenging problems of social control through law will draw
much intellectual nourishment from Professor Friedrich's volume.
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